

IC 77-2499

DOE review completed

16 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John N. McMahon
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Verification

REFERENCE: Letter dated 5 May 1977 to DCI from
E. Giller, same subject

1. Action Requested: Sign the attached memorandum to the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) establishing an ad hoc interagency Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Intelligence Working Group.

2. Background: A draft Presidential Directive, derived from PRM 16: Nuclear Testing (Negotiation with the Soviets on Termination of Nuclear Explosions), is currently circulating among appropriate principals. While the Directive reflects interagency agreement on most of the key issues, further discussion can be anticipated as Ed Giller of Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) pointed out in his 5 May 1977 letter (Reference) to you. In that correspondence Ed proposed that an NFIB in-depth review and discussion be conducted concerning intelligence responsibilities associated with monitoring a multilateral CTB.

On 23 May I met with Ed Giller and appropriate representatives from ERDA, the Intelligence Community Staff, and the National Intelligence Staff to discuss the ERDA proposals and to seek a means by which such a review might be accomplished. The meeting emphasized that the CTB as presently envisioned reaches far beyond the boundaries of strategic Limited Test Ban Treaty concerns and encompasses the broad range of global nuclear proliferation issues. Among the elements discussed were

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the expanded dimension of verification, monitoring/ verification requirements, political issues of verification, technical monitoring considerations, and community actions and options. These subjects suggest that fundamental Intelligence Community roles and missions will be at issue also. There was agreement that a temporary working group ought to be established.

3. Staff Position: The attached memorandum for NFIB has been coordinated with ERDA and the National Intelligence Officers for Strategic Programs and Nuclear Proliferation.

4. Recommendation: The recent agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union to establish working groups on a comprehensive test ban and on nuclear proliferation provides stimulus and some urgency to move forward in the establishment of the CTB Intelligence Working Group. Recommend you sign the attached correspondence.

John N. McMahon

Attachment

As Stated Herewith

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

02 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM: Stansfield Turner
Chairman

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Test Ban Verification

1. The United States and the Soviet Union have begun preliminary discussions concerning the negotiation of a multilateral treaty to terminate nuclear testing, as proposed by the President. The significantly expanded dimension of this treaty, over that of the Limited Test Ban Treaty currently in effect, will increase the scope and complexity of the responsibilities assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence and bring into focus the issue of appropriate roles and missions within the Community.

2. In order to ensure that the Intelligence Community can assume these increased responsibilities, I have established an interagency CTB Intelligence Working Group, to be chaired by a member of the Intelligence Community Staff. Interested members are invited to designate to my Acting Deputy for the Intelligence Community (Point of Contact: a representative to this group. The first meeting of the Working Group will convene at the Community Headquarters Building on 23 June 1977.

3. I am directing that this Working Group prepare a report for the NFIB no later than 15 August 1977 on the following two tasks:

--Task 1: The CTB Intelligence Working Group is to examine in depth the appropriate roles and missions of the DCI and the Community agencies and organizations in the monitoring and verification of the proposed CTB. This examination should address the capabilities of and the interrelationship among Community elements as well as the

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interface of these elements with other government agencies and organizations, and should present issues and options for subsequent NFIB consideration.

--Task 2: The CTB Intelligence Working Group is to determine the requirements for intelligence in support of CTB verification, to identify the resulting intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting needs; to analyze current and planned intelligence capabilities in order to identify deficiencies; to address the relationship between CTB and nuclear proliferation intelligence activities; to recommend improvements in intelligence capabilities and procedures; and to propose options for the coordination or management of interagency CTB monitoring functions.

SIGNED

STANSFIELD TURNER

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
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UNITED STATES
 ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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MAY 5 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner, US Navy
 Director of Central Intelligence
 Washington, DC 20505

AUTHENTICATED May 5, 1977
 U.S. ENERGY RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
 BY: *[Signature]*
 DOCUMENT NO. CLXXVIII-235-1A

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN VERIFICATION

As I mentioned to you a few days ago, I am becoming increasingly concerned with certain aspects regarding verification of international compliance with the multilateral Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) under consideration by the Administration. Although the PRM 16 review addresses many aspects of verification, I feel additional consideration by the NFIB is warranted. The purpose of this letter is to outline my concerns and to recommend two NFIB actions.

As you will recall, Safeguard (d) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (referred to as the LTBT) represents one of four conditions imposed by the U.S. Senate to the ratification of the treaty in August 1963. Its provisions require "The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements."

On 29 February 1964, the Secretary of Defense recommended that "the monitoring of actions taken in furtherance of Safeguard (d)...is basically an intelligence function and falls properly as a responsibility of the United States Intelligence Board. The USIB should coordinate all intelligence activities to maintain Safeguard (d)." The USIB subsequently accepted this responsibility and approved the recommendation that "the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee be designated as the action agency to monitor the Safeguard (d) problem." The JAEIC prepared, and USIB subsequently approved national-level intelligence guidance applicable to Safeguard (d). The NFIB subsequently assumed all USIB responsibilities with respect to Safeguard (d) and approved the most recent Safeguard (d) report in February 1977.

The successful negotiation and implementation of a multilateral CTB would increase the technical dimension of verification over that required for monitoring the LTBT in at least three ways. First, whereas the LTBT requires monitoring only of Soviet and Chinese nuclear tests, a CTB would necessitate monitoring tests of other nuclear weapon states as well as many non-nuclear weapon states. Second, a CTB would change the fundamental verification issue from determining the location of nuclear explosions (atmosphere,

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 Ray E. Chapman

outer space, or underwater vice underground) to determining the nature of explosions (nuclear vice non-nuclear). Third, the military and political implication of undetected violations of a CTB (whether by a NWS or NNWS) might be more significant than for a LTBT.

Verification of a CTB raises two additional issues which are basically political in nature. First, U.S. statements concerning possible violations of the CTB must be based on information which can be revealed to other nations without jeopardizing sensitive sources and methods and which is politically acceptable to those nations lacking comparable national technical means of verification. Second, the assignment of verification and monitoring responsibilities to U.S. departments and agencies, especially where in-country activities such as on-site inspection are included, must be politically acceptable to the foreign governments involved.

In light of this expanded dimension associated with the verification of a multilateral CTB, I feel it is essential for the NFIB to undertake an in-depth review of this issue at an early date. It would also be useful for NFIB to address the fundamental intelligence responsibilities the Community must assume in support of the international verification of a CTB. In this regard I would be happy to provide a short background paper and lead the NFIB discussion. As an outcome I would expect NFIB to provide guidance to the IC staff and perhaps the JAEIC which would facilitate timely action and preparation in support of the Administration's initiatives in this area.

I would be pleased to discuss these issues with you and with the NFIB at an appropriate time.


Edward B. Giller
Senior Intelligence Officer

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